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Abstract
In early 2007, the Indonesian government decided to withhold its bird ﬂ  u virus samples from 
WHO’s collaborating centres pending a new global mechanism for virus sharing that had better 
terms for developing countries. Th   e 60th World Health Assembly subsequently resolved to establish 
an international stockpile of avian ﬂ  u vaccines, and mandated WHO to formulate mechanisms 
and guidelines for equitable access to these vaccines. Are there analogous opportunities for study 
volunteers or donors of biological materials in clinical trials or other research settings to exercise 
corresponding leverage to advance health equity?
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Shifting Alignments in International Health?
On February 16, 2007, the Minister of Health of Indonesia Siti Fadilah Supari informed senior World 
Health Organization (WHO) oﬃ   cials David Heyman (Assistant Director General for Communicable Dis-
eases) and Keiji Fukuda (Director for the Global Inﬂ  uenza Program) that Indonesia would continue with-
holding its bird ﬂ  u virus samples from WHO’s collaborating centres pending a new global mechanism for 
virus sharing that had better terms for developing countries. In breaking with the existing practice of freely 
sending ﬂ  u virus samples to these laboratories, the health minister expressed dissatisfaction with a system 
which obliged WHO member states to share virus samples with WHO’s collaborating centres, but which 
lacked mechanisms for equitable sharing of beneﬁ  ts, most importantly aﬀ  ordable vaccines developed from 
these viral source materials by patent-seeking commercial entities:
Indonesia will insist on a material transfer agreement before sending the Indonesian strain 
of bird ﬂ  u virus to foreign laboratories to prevent them from being used for commercial 
purposes…We agree to send the virus to the WHO with new conditions or mechanisms ap-
proved by both parties as well as by other developing countries. Until then, we won’t share 
the samples…Th   e organization [WHO] sometimes forgets the good of the people in general 
and we want to change that…
Siti Fadilah Supari, Minister of Health, Indonesia
www.thejakartapost.com, February 17, 2007
(accessed on February 23, 2007)
A month later, the Indonesian government reiterated its stance, reported thus by Th  e  Nation 
(Bangkok) on March 15, 2007:
Indonesia will not share bird ﬂ  u samples with the World Health Organisation without a 
legally binding agreement promising the virus will not be used to develop an unaﬀ  ordable 
commercial vaccine, the health minister said yesterday. Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari 
said last month’s letter of guarantee from WHO Director-General Margaret Chan was not 
good enough. “Th   at’s just an agreement in principle” Supari said, [further adding that] the 
system, which enables inﬂ  uenza [virus] samples to be freely passed throughout the global 
community for public health purposes, needs to be revised so it is “fair for developing coun-
tries, poor countries, aﬀ  ected countries. We will not share our virus sample without a change 
in [WHO’s virus sharing] rules”. Indonesia is worried that large drug companies will use its 
H5N1 strain to make vaccines that will ultimately be unaﬀ  ordable for developing nations.
To consolidate regional support for this initiative, a meeting of Asia Paciﬁ  c developing countries was 
convened in late March 2007 to explore mechanisms for more equitable access to vaccines produced from 
virus sharing arrangements. Th   e Indonesian decision elicited unease, but also sympathy from a cross-section 
of the global community, including an editorial from the Lancet:2  DESA Working Paper No. 41
To protect the global population, 6.2 billion doses of pandemic vaccine will be needed, but 
current manufacturing capacity can only produce 500 million doses. In November 2004, 
a WHO consultation reached the depressing conclusion that most developing countries 
would have no access to vaccine during the ﬁ  rst wave of a pandemic and possibly through-
out its duration…Indonesia’s move to secure an aﬀ  ordable vaccine supply for its population 
is understandable… the country has made a controversial decision not to share its H5N1 
virus samples with WHO. Indonesia is instead planning to provide a US pharmaceutical 
company [Baxter] with the strains in exchange for technology to manufacture a pandemic 
vaccine. Th   is strategy is a marked departure from the existing WHO virus-sharing system, 
in which inﬂ  uenza viruses are donated by countries and ﬂ  ow freely to the global community 
for vaccine development. Indonesia fears that vaccines produced from their viruses via the 
WHO system will not be aﬀ  ordable to them. Th   e fairest way forward would be for WHO 
to seek an international agreement that would ensure that developing countries have equal 
access to a pandemic vaccine, at an aﬀ  ordable price. Such a move would demonstrate global 
solidarity in preparing for the next pandemic. (Lancet editorial, February 17, 2007)
On March 29, 2007, immediately following an interim agreement for Indonesia to resume sending 
ﬂ  u virus samples to WHO, health ministers of eighteen Asia-Paciﬁ  c countries issued a Jakarta Declaration 
which called upon WHO “to convene the necessary meetings, initiate the critical processes and obtain the 
essential commitment of all stakeholders to establish the mechanisms for more open virus and information 
sharing and accessibility to avian inﬂ  uenza and other potential pandemic inﬂ  uenza vaccines for developing 
countries”1. Th   ese proposals were tabled at the 60th World Health Assembly in Geneva (May 14–23, 2007) 
as part of a resolution calling for new mechanisms for virus sharing and for more equitable access to vaccines 
developed from these viral source materials. 
In the course of the deliberations, it emerged that WHO had violated the terms of the 2005 WHO 
guidelines2 on sharing of viruses which required the consent of donor countries before WHO’s collaborating 
centres could pass on the viruses to third parties such as vaccine manufacturers. While discouraging the use 
of material transfer agreements (MTAs) at the point when donor countries transferred their virus samples to 
WHO, WHO’s collaborating centres nonetheless resorted to MTAs when they transferred to third parties 
vaccine strains containing parts of the viruses supplied by developing countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam 
and China. Indeed WHO’s collaborating centres themselves, as well as third parties, had sought patents 
covering parts of the source viruses used in developing vaccines and diagnostics3. Possibly the most conten-
tious item on the health assembly’s agenda in 2007, the issue of virus sharing and access to avian ﬂ  u vaccines 
remained unresolved until the ﬁ  nal hours of the gathering when a resolution was adopted mandating WHO 
to establish an international stockpile of vaccines for H5N1 or other inﬂ  uenza viruses of pandemic potential, 
and to formulate mechanisms and guidelines for equitable access to aﬀ  ordable pandemic ﬂ  u vaccines4. Th  e 
1  Full text of the Jakarta Declaration on Responsible Practices for Sharing Avian Inﬂ  uenza Viruses and Resulting Beneﬁ  ts, 
available at http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/information/details.php?type=press_releases&id=122 (accessed on 11 
May 2007).
2  Avian and pandemic inﬂ  uenza: developments, response and follow-up, and application of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) - Best practice for sharing inﬂ  uenza viruses and sequence data. EB120/INF.DOC./3 (WHO 
Executive Board, 120th session), 11 January 2007. Geneva: World Health Organisation.
3  TWN Information Service on Health Issues, 22 May 2007. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/
twninfohealth090.htm (accessed on May 23, 2007).
4 Pandemic  inﬂ  uenza preparedness: sharing of inﬂ  uenza viruses and access to vaccines and other beneﬁ  ts. Resolution 
WHA60.28, adopted at the 60th World Health Assembly (Geneva, 23 May 2007) http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/
pdf_ﬁ  les/WHA60/A60_R28-en.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2007).Developing Countries, Donor Leverage, and Access to Bird Flu Vaccines          3
resolution also requested a WHO working group to draft new Terms of Reference (TORs) for WHO col-
laborating centres and its H5 reference laboratories for the sharing of inﬂ  uenza viruses, to be submitted to a 
special intergovernmental meeting of WHO member states.
Th   e Indonesian standoﬀ   with WHO came on the heels of Director-General Margaret Chan’s 
admonishment to the Th   ai Ministry of Public Health in February 2007 over the issuance of compulsory 
licenses for HIV/AIDS and heart medications5. In the course of a visit to the National Health Security Of-
ﬁ  ce in Bangkok, she had publicly urged the Th   ai health authorities to seek instead a negotiated compromise 
with pharmaceutical companies over high drug prices. Th   is perceived tilt drew strong criticism from health 
advocates in Th   ailand and elsewhere who pointed out that the Th   ai Ministry of Public Health “has been in 
regular contact with the industry over high prices of its drugs in Th   ailand, but these negotiations have led 
nowhere. Th   e best price for originator’s efavirenz is still twice the price available from Indian generic sources 
(US$500 per patient a year vs $224). Th   e best oﬀ  er for originator’s lopinavir/ritonavir is $2000 per patient 
a year, ﬁ  ve times more than WHO’s estimate of manufacturing costs. Th  e  Th   ai Ministry of Health estimates 
that the price of clopidogrel would fall by over 90% if made generically. Th   ese are substantial price diﬀ  er-
ences in a country where the average annual wage is $1400 a year” 6.
It is unclear whether these episodes amount to tactical shifts, let alone a more fundamental re-align-
ment between WHO, member states, corporate actors, and health activists on the issue of access to essen-
tial medicines. Th  e  ramiﬁ  cations are clear however for the interlinked concerns of global health equity and 
international health security. 
Th   e Indonesian government’s stance in particular was notable on three counts: 
it was explicitly a critique of WHO’s balance of pragmatism which it felt was overly accommo- • 
dative of corporate priorities7, to the detriment of the health and wellbeing of a key constituency 
that WHO was mandated to defend, the underserved communities among its member states
it was an exercise of leverage by a source country of biological materials seeking to redress the in- • 
equities of access to what may be vitally important health inputs (avian ﬂ  u vaccines)8 developed 
from these source materials
5  WHO raps compulsory licensing plan: Govt urged to seek talks with drug ﬁ  rms. (Th   e Bangkok Post, 2 February 2007) 
available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-February/010493.html (accessed on April 2, 2007); 
compulsory licenses issued in January 2007 by the Th   ai Ministry of Public Health for a heat-stable formulation of 
Kaletra (anti-retroviral) and Plavix (clopidogrel, anti-platelet drug) are posted at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/
thailand/ (accessed on April 2, 2007).
6  P Cawthorne, N Ford, J Limpananont, N Tienudom & W Purahong. 2007. WHO must defend patients’ interests, 
not industry. Lancet 369: 974-975. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140673607604735/fulltext 
(accessed on April 4, 2007).
7 Th  e  Th   ird World Network (TWN) has also criticised WHO’s “best practice” guidelines for sharing of virus samples, 
pointing out that a well-meaning non-proﬁ  t modus operandi expected of national inﬂ  uenza centre laboratories, WHO 
collaborating centres and H5 reference laboratories, along with an expectation that candidate inﬂ  uenza vaccine 
strains be provided gratis to any vaccine producer requesting for such materials, would undercut the leverage of source 
countries in negotiating for fair beneﬁ  t-sharing in line with the Convention on Biological Diversity’s principles of 
access, prior informed consent and beneﬁ  t-sharing. (“Winners and losers in the sharing of avian ﬂ  u viruses”. TWN 
Information Service on Health Issues, May 11, 2007) http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/twninfohealth089.
htm (accessed on May 12, 2007).
8  In April 2007, the US Food & Drug Administration approved the ﬁ  rst human vaccine against H5N1 avian inﬂ  uenza. 
Th   is pre-pandemic vaccine, approved for people aged 18 to 64 years, is administered in two doses separated by a 
month’s interval. Th  e  eﬃ   cacy of 45 per cent (protective levels of antibody response among half the trial subjects) is 
quite modest but would still have an impact on population health if the protective eﬀ  ect extends as well to the actual 
pandemic viral strain. http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/NEW01611.html (accessed on May 24, 2007).4  DESA Working Paper No. 41
it was seeking equitable beneﬁ  ts from commercial developers not just for its nationals but for  • 
other communities as well who were likely to be sidelined by commercially-driven product 
development and distribution systems
Commodiﬁ  cation and the Gift Relationship
Th   ese developments call to mind Th   e Gift Relationship, a study of blood donation systems in the US and UK 
published by Richard Titmuss, a pre-eminent ﬁ  gure of UK social policy at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science. In this 1970 classic9, Titmuss demonstrated that a blood donation system relying on 
unpaid donors and operated on a non-commercial basis by the public sector (UK) outperformed a system 
relying largely on paid donors (in cash or in kind) and on proﬁ  t-driven processing and distribution (US), by 
the criteria of availability and aﬀ  ordability, quality and safety, and economic eﬃ   ciency and equity.
Th   at of course was pre-Th   atcherite Britain. With the prevailing (and still tenacious) ethos of neo-
liberalism, donors of biological materials which might eventually yield commercially proﬁ  table products not 
surprisingly come to expect a share of the ﬁ  nancial gains made possible by their donated materials.
John Moore v. Th   e Regents of the University of California (1990) for instance was a celebrated case of a 
leukemia patient who underwent surgery in 1976 at the University of California for removal of his cancerous 
spleen. Th   e University of California was later granted a patent for a cell line called “Mo” established from 
his spleen, which produced valuable proteins [cytokines, including ones which mediate antibacterial and 
cancer-ﬁ  ghting activity] with a long-term commercial value estimated at over one billion dollars. Moore ﬁ  led 
suit and demanded the return of the cells and control over his body parts, but the California Supreme Court 
ruled that he was not entitled to any rights to his own cells after they had been removed from his body10. 
Th   is principle was re-aﬃ   rmed in the New Jersey state legislature in 1996 when it enacted legal pro-
tections against genetic discrimination in employment and in health insurance. Th   is same legislature how-
ever also rejected a draft clause which would have declared individual genomic information to be individual, 
private property, which prompted George Annas, professor of law and public health at Boston University to 
remark that it was “bizarre that other people can own your genetic information [and body parts], but you 
can’t”11.
A neo-liberal environment thus tends to undermine altruistic (gifting) inclinations, encouraging 
instead pecuniary if not mercenary tendencies among donors who might otherwise be disposed towards vol-
untarism, communitarian practices and the common good. Bluntly put, “if researchers and their commercial 
sponsors are going to enrich themselves using my biological samples and personal data, why shouldn’t I get 
my share of it?” Publicly supported charities however such as Cancer Research UK notably continue to allow 
free use of its research output (such as the patented breast cancer gene BRCA2) by publicly-owned laborato-
ries and hospitals12. 
9  Richard M. Titmuss. 1970. Th   e Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. London: LSE Books (republished 
in 1997, with additional chapters, edited by Ann Oakley and John Ashton).
10  John Moore v. Th   e Regents of the University of California, Supreme Court of California: 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 
271 Cal. Reporter. 146 (July 9, 1990).
11  Nature, November 21, 1996.
12  Susan Major. 2004. Charity makes cancer gene freely available across Europe. BMJ 328: 423 (21 February, 2004).Developing Countries, Donor Leverage, and Access to Bird Flu Vaccines          5
Reasserting the Public Domain: Between Commons and Commodiﬁ  cation
Edward R. Murrow (reporter): Who owns the patent on this [polio] vaccine?
Jonas Salk: Well, the people, I would say. Th   ere is no patent. Could you patent the sun?
12 April 1955, Ann Arbor, Michigan13
In the 1990s, Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI, now the Action Group on Erosion, 
Technology and Concentration, ETC) together with a network of indigenous peoples support groups 
proposed an international campaign aiming at a formal Declaration of a Global Genetics Commons. Sir 
John Sulston (2002 Nobel laureate in medicine or physiology) endorsed a very similar idea, which sought a 
declaration of the human genome as the common heritage of humanity and for its DNA sequences to be oﬀ   
limits to patents and intellectual property claims.
In the event, the idea was shelved, in part due to the realisation that even if genomic DNA sequenc-
es were not patentable, downstream technologies arising for example from transcriptomics and proteomics 
could still be subject to intellectual property claims14.
Was the patenting of body parts and genetic information part and parcel of an unavoidable trend 
towards the commodiﬁ  cation of life forms then?
A middle path which accepts intellectual property claims on these biological entities but which en-
sures that these are retained within the (international) public domain (vested for example in trustee institu-
tions which are mandated to serve the public good on an equitable needs basis) is one option which may be 
worth exploring. Indeed the Convention on Biological Diversity (1993), in recognizing the sovereign rights 
of countries over their biological and genetic resources, enshrines one form of this principle.
In the US, it would be appropriate to reappraise the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) and the Stevenson-
Wydler Act (1980) which markedly altered the balance between public versus private claims on intellectual 
property arising from publicly-funded research. Prior to 1980, patentable ﬁ  ndings arising from federally 
funded research became the intellectual property of the US federal government which was vested in public 
agencies such as the National Institutes of Health. 
13  Jane S. Smith, in her book Patenting the Sun: Polio and the Salk Vaccine (New York: William Morrow & Company, 
Inc. 1990, p. 305-312) records that Jonas Salk made these oft quoted remarks during a televised interview to announce 
the results of successful population trials of the killed-virus polio vaccine. Cynics, and Salk’s detractors have pointed 
out that lawyers for the March of Dimes foundation (his research funders) had earlier determined that no part of his 
vaccine procedure was new and could be patented. But that misses a point - would Salk (or the March of Dimes) 
have gone for a patent under the present more relaxed patent regimes, most importantly, the landmark US Supreme 
Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) to allow the patenting of life forms, the Bayh-Dole (1980) and 
Stevenson-Wydler (1980) Acts, John Moore v. Th   e Regents of the University of California (1990), all contributing towards 
the enabling legal environment for the rapid expansion of proﬁ  t-driven biotechnology. Rather than just focus and 
speculate on Salk’s moral core, perhaps one should also ask what alternative enabling environments would help tilt the 
balance between public vs. private claims on publicly-funded intellectual property, to advance health equity and the 
public good? We are left pondering, for instance, what John Moore might have done if he were presented with various 
hypothetical scenarios for disposition of beneﬁ  ts arising from his cells. 
14  A situation might arise for instance, akin to the following analogy which unfairly privileges those in possession of 
advanced means of exploiting “global commons resources”: I have a sophisticated technology which can mine this 
exotic mineral found within your borders. Insofar as you cannot extract it yourself, you deserve no part of the beneﬁ  ts 
from my successful exploitation of this mineral, which should be considered a “commons resource” in the “global 
public domain”.6  DESA Working Paper No. 41
Th   e Bayh-Dole Act (1980) in essence transferred these rights to federally-funded research grant-
ees and their institutions for commercial development. Th   e Stevenson-Wydler Act (1980) required federal 
agencies to transfer technology in their possession to state and local governments and to the private sector 
for commercial development, albeit subject to certain march-in rights (such as compulsory licenses) which 
could be exercised by governmental authorities in times of urgent public need or national emergencies. Th  ese 
march-in rights applied to both Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler, but the Acts also provided for royalties 
from commercialisation to be shared with the inventor as an incentive for useful innovations.
In 2003, US Congressman Dennis Kucinich announced that he intended to introduce legislation 
“that would create a new network of government labs for the research, development and manufacture of 
pharmaceutical products and biologics… When discoveries are made, the patents would be held by the gov-
ernment and nonexclusive licenses would be attached to them. Th   is would allow companies to compete to 
manufacture pharmaceutical products, just like generic drug companies do now. Th   is would radically bring 
down the cost of drugs [and would also] increase the aﬀ  ordability of cures worldwide… We have watched 
the pharmaceutical industry fail on three counts: submitting fewer and fewer drugs to FDA for approval, 
creating “copycat” drugs instead of truly new cures, and raising drug prices higher every year. Our current 
patent system is what encourages artiﬁ  cial improvements and keeps prices high. It seems clear that one of the 
keys to public health is establishing public patents” 15.
Kucinich’s initiative, an admirable but uphill struggle, would entail a rolling back of some aspects of 
the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts. A less ambitious strategy has been proposed by researchers at Yale 
and University of Pennsylvania which urges US research universities to adopt open licensing practices, what 
were referred to as Equitable Access Licenses16.
Five years ago, one of us (CCK) participated in European Commission (EC) grant review panels for 
EC-funded collaborative research between EU and Asian countries. A suggestion was made that the intellec-
tual property arising from the projects under review could perhaps be vested in, say WHO, as an example of 
an international public agency, to keep the intellectual property within the international public domain. In 
such a scenario, WHO could for instance license these patents on a nonexclusive basis for product develop-
ment so that useful and aﬀ  ordably-priced generics could be produced in a competitive environment. (For 
that to happen however, WHO would have to regain its credibility among developing countries, eroded 
in the aftermath of the 60th World Health Assembly in May 200717, and achieve a better balance between 
proﬁ  t-driven production of essential medicines, and equitable access to these products. Absent this, the In-
ternational Health Regulations 200518, which came into force in June 2007 and imposes mandatory disease 
reporting obligations on signatory member states, could reduce poorer front-line states to the role of pan-
demic “canaries”19 in an early warning system for emergent ﬂ  u pandemics).
15  Dennis J. Kucinich. Th   e Case for Public Patents. Th  e  Nation  (New York), June 19, 2003.
16  S Chaifetz, DA Chokshi, R Rajkumar, D Scales, Y Benkler. 2007. Closing the access gap for health 
innovations: an open licensing proposal for universities. Globalization and Health 3: 1 (posted 1 February 2007). 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/1 (accessed on April 2, 2007).
17  WHO shaken up by delegates’ criticisms on IPR issues. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/
twninfohealth091.htm (accessed on May 24, 2007).
18  International Health Regulations (2005) http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_ﬁ  les/WHA58/WHA58_3-en.pdf 
(accessed on June 17, 2007).
19  Canaries, which were exquisitely sensitive to low levels of carbon monoxide, were early warning systems for coal miners 
confronted with risks of underground methane and mine explosions (or mine ﬁ  res), and the resultant carbon monoxide.Developing Countries, Donor Leverage, and Access to Bird Flu Vaccines          7
Th   e modest fees that WHO could earn from this nonexclusive licensing could perhaps further yield 
a small bonus by lessening the dependence of the institution on donor governments (and corporate donors), 
and hence expand the latitude for its independent role in international health policy advising and technical 
support. Th   e recent episodes between ASEAN governments and WHO, over access to essential medicines, 
arguably underscore the importance of independent sources of revenue for WHO.
Donor Leverage and Trusteeship Arrangements?
Set in this context, the Indonesian initiative on new virus sharing arrangements is therefore noteworthy and 
its exercise of donor leverage20 may presage a consideration of trusteeships which could serve as public (inter-
national or regional) repositories of genetic resources, genomic information, and other biological materials. 
Th   e Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis in 1997 gave impetus to a regional eﬀ  ort at managing ﬁ  nancial instability 
caused by volatile capital ﬂ  ows and speculative currency attacks. Recognizing the increasing integration of 
East and Southeast Asian economies, a Chiang Mai Initiative21 emerged in May 2000, initially as a network 
of bilateral swap agreements among ASEAN+3 member states22, which might yet evolve into a de facto Asian 
Monetary Fund following a May 2007 decision to multi-lateralize an $80 billion pool of foreign exchange 
reserves of ASEAN+3 member states23. Beyond the risk of ﬁ  nancial contagion in globalized capital markets, 
the SARS epidemic of 2002-2003 forcefully demonstrated the regional economic consequences of a life-
threatening infectious epidemic24, eﬀ  ects which would pale in comparison with the devastating human and 
economic impact of an outbreak of highly transmissible and lethal human ﬂ  u on the scale of the 1918-1919 
pandemic25. 
Notwithstanding the resolution adopted at the 60th World Health Assembly requesting WHO to 
establish an international stockpile of vaccines for H5N1 or other inﬂ  uenza viruses of pandemic potential, 
the limited vaccine production capacity globally, not to mention the ﬁ  nancial needs for establishing and 
maintaining a stockpile of adequate size, are key issues that remain to be addressed. A persuasive case could 
therefore still be made that ASEAN+3 might provide a potential institutional framework for mobilizing the 
ﬁ  nancial and technological resources in the region to enhance regional preparedness and response capabili-
20  Donor leverage could be thought of as a conditional form of the gift relationship. We are familiar with donor leverage 
in another context, viz. the conditional gifting of the Gates, Soros, Rockefeller, Ford and other foundations, not to 
mention the conditionalities of bilateral and multilateral aid. On the other hand, a commons perspective on biological 
or genetic resources is often expected of donors, be they countries, communities, or individuals (i.e. an unconditional 
gift relationship). In truth, the diﬀ  erence is more a matter of degree - even the gifting in the Titmuss sense carries with 
it an implicit understanding or expectation or condition that the donated blood is not to be processed and distributed 
for commercial gain. Th  e  diﬀ  erence therefore relates more to “hard” (formal, codiﬁ  ed) as opposed to “soft” (informal, 
ethical and moral pressure) enforcement of conditionalities. 
21  Wang Seok-Dong. 2002. Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia: the Chiang Mai Initiative and Beyond. 
Bulletin on Asia-Paciﬁ  c Perspectives 2002/03. Asia-Paciﬁ  c Economies: Sustaining Growth Amidst Uncertainties. Bangkok: 
UNESCAP.
22 ASEAN  (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Th   ailand, and Viet Nam) 
plus 3 (China, Japan, South Korea).
23  ASEAN+3 agree to cash swap scheme / Countries to pool reserves for stability. (Th   e Yomiuri Shimbun online, May 6, 
2007) http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/20070506TDY01003.htm (accessed on May 7, 2007).
24  E. X. Fan. 2003. SARS: economic impacts and implications. ERD Policy Brief No. 15, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila.
25  G. Kolata. 1999. Flu: Th   e Story of the Great Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus Th   at Caused It. 
New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux.8  DESA Working Paper No. 41
ties in a likely epicentre of an emergent ﬂ  u pandemic. Th   is would go beyond the existing co-ordination of 
surveillance networks to include the development and acquisition of vaccine manufacturing capabilities, to 
augment regional stockpiles of avian ﬂ  u vaccines which can be made available as public goods on a priority 
needs basis.
Beyond the immediate concerns of timely and aﬀ  ordable access to pandemic ﬂ  u vaccines, the Indo-
nesian initiative has also raised the intriguing possibility of other analogous instances where individuals or 
groups of donors of biological materials and personal data could utilize the leverage of their gift relationship 
in clinical trials or other research settings in furtherance of the common good (rather than succumb to mer-
cenary tendencies encouraged by a neo-liberal ethos).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals or groups volunteering in drug trials or human genome 
research are usually unaware of the potential commercial trajectories of downstream product development 
involving patenting of products or processes derived from the donated materials and personal information. 
Th   ese commodities could be prohibitively expensive for many end-users, as well as disruptive for follow-on 
research. Even health professionals involved in the recruitment of volunteers and the execution of the study 
may not be adequately aware of these eventualities. Th   e rules of the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) for instance provide for minimum standards for pharmaceutical research conducted locally or abroad, 
with an informed consent protocol which refers in very general terms to “beneﬁ  ts to the subject or to others 
which may reasonably be expected from the research”26. Th   e Declaration of Helsinki on biomedical research 
ethics (World Medical Association general assembly, 1964; amended 2000)27, sensitive to the vulnerability of 
patients seeking or undergoing treatment, reiterates “the right [of patients] to abstain from participation in 
the [proposed] study or to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal”. 
We look forward to a time when research volunteers will be able to specify (elect for) prior condi-
tionalities for their participation in studies. Th   ese might range from good faith eﬀ  orts to deploy the research 
output in a manner which serves the public good, to more explicit mechanisms aimed at equitable beneﬁ  ts 
on a needs basis.
To that end, we are planning to undertake a survey of clinical trial volunteers (and potential vol-
unteers) to canvass their attitudes towards donation of biological materials and personal information under 
various hypothetical scenarios for beneﬁ  t apportionment or disposition. Related to this, we are also keen to 
explore trusteeship arrangements28 as repositories for retaining intellectual property (IP) in the public do-
main, IP arising from publicly-funded biomedical and health research and involving biological materials and 
personal information freely donated by individual study subjects or communities. 
26  US Food and Drug Administration. Good Clinical Practice; protection of human subjects. Section 50.25: Elements of 
informed consent. http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=50.25 (accessed on May 
24, 2007).
27  World Medical Association. Declaration of Helsinki. http://www.wma.net/e/meetings/fulltext.htm#helsinki (accessed 
on May 24, 2007).
28  We are grateful to Cristina Blohm and Jurgen Simon of Universität Lüneburg for sharing with us their pre-publication 
manuscript ‘Group Consent in Population-based Research’ which included an exploration of various scenarios for 
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In summary, we intend to, and we seek potential collaborators to:
examine the possibilities for conditional participation by volunteers in clinical trials • 
conduct a survey of attitudes among clinical trial volunteers and potential volunteers, in regard  • 
to donation of biological samples and personal information, under various speciﬁ  ed scenarios of 
participation in clinical trials
explore possible mechanisms for operationalizing conditionalities in the recruitment, enrolment,  • 
consent, participation, and donation of information and samples by volunteers in clinical trials
explore possible trusteeship arrangements to serve as repositories for retaining in the public  • 
domain intellectual property arising from publicly-funded biomedical and health research which 
may involve biological materials and personal information freely donated by individual study 
subjects or communities.